Best of the Transparent Hummingbird
relevancy by propensity — r v straffen — via abnormal prpoensity that it had to be admitted becos of the force of relevancy — albeit NOT being a proper application of the makin rule
boardman v dpp degrees of relevance
probative force is hte key sge must be probative nad of a live issue
prejudicial effect mustbe taken into account
i find similar fact evidence and character evidence extremely troubling. i was wondering how our evidence act (which is a 1893 act), as well as common law evidence law principles as they have evolved in similar jurisdictions, run up against modern psychological
don’t we now know of all kinds of cognitive biases that could influence verdicts (
until 2012 the evidence act still explicitly permitted an attorney to attack the credibility of a rape complainant by bringing up their “immoral behaviour” i find that so outrageous i cannot begin Section 157 (d) of the Evidence Act states:
In 1894 in Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales similar fact evidence became not only an exclusionary rule but also an inclusionary rule which admitted two categories of relevant evidence to prove plan or design and rebut a defence which would otherwise have been opened to the accused. In time, the categories were extended and in 1974 in DPP v Boardman two tests of admissibility were enunciated: (i) that the evidence is of positive probative value; or (ii) that it is uniquely or strikingly similar. In 1991 in R v P the aforementioned tests were replaced by a single test: that the probative value of the similar fact evidence is sufficiently great to make it just notwithstanding its prejudicial value and that such probative value could be derived from striking similarity or the former �categories� now regarded as examples . It is worthy of note that joinder of counts and of the accused under Rule 9 of the Indictment Rules Act 1971 and statutory provisions on similar facts � section 1 (2) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and section 27 (3) of the Theft Act 1968 remain unaffected by section 101 (1) (d) of the CJA 2003.
amazing acoustics in the chapelle notre-dame du brusc: they had a flutist
elgar: salut d’amour faure: sicilienne faure: apres un reve gounod: ave maria albinoni: adagio
wedding brunch pastries ham and melon ham other kind grilled veg cheeses fruit pizza tomato on millefueille and paste base
mayo nd mousse and veg moza and gaspacho pinenuts artichaut soup and truffle cream spring roll wrap prawn chicken on skewers
i asked julian a few hypotheticals: if i told you this, how would this affect your judgment? what if i told you this instead? would this be a relevant fact in determining
to my surprise, he said it was relevant to him, because past behaviour is a good indicator of future behaviour
in jurisdictions where evidence law evolved out of common law principles
for me when we write reps i prefer to write reps that dispute charges on the facts or on the law or even for compassionate reasons. i hate the fact we normally spend 2-3 pages on the character of the accused. i know we always say the point is to paint a sympathetic character of the accused but if i were the prosecutor why would i care? i don’t even buy the consistency argument i.e. a person of good character would never commit a crime: it would be out of character and highly unlikely — but that could be the one time they do do it.
absentminded i could very well take something out of the supermarket without paying — the other day i actually nearly did that
law like medicine is a professional degree; the tuition fees are high, second only to medicine. and there are hefty professional board exam fees and training. it is not a generalist degree.
you don’t tell the medical students that they should not expect to be doctors after graduation. why should you tell that to the law students?
the transferrable skills argument is true
of course ours being a first degree rather — many people they shouldn’t have to make up their mind so early and that’s fine not all the people who but eventually become lawyers that’s fine but for those who do enter intending to become lawyers which is the majority of people
for instance, if you are trying to prove insurance fraud. admitting evidence that the same insurance claimant had had 7 accidents of a similar kind in the past 10 months and each time had made a claim. makin — it is un
he took her diving at an area known to be hazardous for its currents and knowing she was a novice allowed (encouraged) her to dive alone.) when she didn’t come back up he didn’t go down to look for her. he raised the alert the next day and never participatd in any search for her and was reportedly unconcerned. the body was never found. within 24 days of her disappearance he made insurance claims of her life policy. later a flipper worn by her was recovered — it was shown the flipper was tampered with — the heel strap was cut through cleanly at two spots with a sharp instrument and wouc have
he was convicted bya jury trial (this was in the 60s) today — only circumstantial evidence pure circumstantial evidence convictions the magistrate actually but — it is hard
conviction. and this is a coniction on pure cisumcstantial evidence. onthe other hand ou knew someone had probative value is so much greater than
or they cannot
singapore’s evidence act is narrower than the common law sfe principles: sfe cannot be used to rebut a defence.
siutational factors
character in civil cases irrelevant: you can breach a contract or suffer a ciil wrong
but accused — good character is relevant relevant to credibility as witness
the proposition in teo ai nee that there is no reason we can’t have a common law test as that in boardman v dpp (for similar fact evidence) and that we should not be constrained by the strictures of our evidence act is frankly unconstitutional.
cognitive bias or emotional bias or moral reasoning