Julian is at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Neuroscience in Chicago, and an American District Judge (who shall not be named) has asked to make a special visit to his poster on moral psychology and decision making. J has a small panic attack, for he is but a humble neuroscientist and knows not how to speak to judges. “What do I call him,” he wails. As it happens I do not know what Americans call their District Judges (I imagine “Your Honour” is universal, and if incorrect, has at least the right ring of respect and respectability to fall within the bounds of acceptable mistakes?) but I took to Facebook (crowdsourcing etiquette is a last resort, but there is no time to lose) while he is on the line. The consensus is that you call him Judge [Last name], so armed with this information and my 5 minute summary (of a googled version) of said Judge’s CV and recent decisions, he has gone off to his session. I await a report by the phone, and if you also are in Chicago, you may also like to visit his poster, at Hall A of McCormick Place. Abstract follows.
082. Social Decision Making
Location: Hall A
Time: Saturday, October 17, 2015, 1:00 PM - 5:00 PM
Program#/Poster#: 82.14/X2
Topic: F.01. Human Cognition and Behavior
Support: NUS R-581-000-123-133
NUS R-581-000-133-112
Title: Disgust sensitivity and pupillometric responses independently predict the effect of disgust
stimuli on moral judgments
Authors: *J. Z. LIM1 , M. LEE2 , K. WONG1, O. MULLETTE-GILLMAN2,4,3;
Abstract:
Disgust stimuli alter moral judgment, but it is unclear if this modulation is due solely
to disgust, or if physiological arousal may underlie this effect. Recently we demonstrated that
disgust modulation of moral judgments across different domains is a bi-directional function of
individual disgust sensitivity (DS). Here, we test whether arousal plays a mediating role in this
relationship using pupillometry as a measure of state arousal. Participants (N=39) underwent
pupillometry while judging the moral acceptability of utilitarian harm in personal moral
dilemmas. Before each scenario, a disgust or neutral facial expression was presented for gender
discrimination. Participants completed the Disgust Sensitive Scale (Revised) and the Affect
Intensity Measure (AIM), a measure of trait arousability. First, we replicated that disgust
sensitivity determines the degree and direction of the change in moral judgment, with
significance in a one-way ANCOVA of change in ratings across disgust and neutral conditions
with DS as a covariate (F1,37 = 4.34, p =.04, partial eta-squared = .11). We then examined
whether arousal, as measured by pupillometry, could account for this modulation of moral
judgment. We focused on a window 2-4s after the onset of facial primes; where prior studies
have shown emotional stimuli modulate pupil dilation. We averaged the pupillometric difference
between disgust and neutral conditions as a measure of the manipulated change in state arousal,
and examined whether this change could account for the change in moral judgment. This was
accomplished through a multiple regression with both this arousal factor and individual DS as
predictors of change in moral judgment. Both arousal and DS independently influence changes in
judgment (Model R-squared = .195; DS: ß = 0.36, t = 2.50, p = .02; Pupil size difference: ß =
0.36, t = 2.46, p = .02). Our results show that both state arousal and disgust independently
modulate moral judgments, and that arousal does not mediate the relationship reported in our
first bidirectional function. This finding demonstrates that moral decision-making is not only the
interplay of reason and emotion (disgust, moderated by individual sensitivity), but that additional
physiological factors also play a critical role.
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